This paper offers a thesis as to why the US overtook the UK and other European countries in the 20th century in both aggregate and per-capita GDP, as a case study of recent models of endogenous growth where human capital is the "engine of growth". The conjecture is that the ascendancy of the US as an economic superpower owes in large measure to its relatively faster human capital formation. Whether the thesis has legs to stand on is assessed through stylized facts indicating that the US led other OECD countries in schooling attainments per adult population over the 20 century, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels. While human capital is viewed as the direct facilitator of growth, the underlying factors driving the US ascendancy are linked to the superior returns the political-economic system in the US has so far offered individual human capital attainments, both home-produced and imported.
A more specific objective of the presentation is to illustrate the power of the "human capital hypothesis" to explain observed differences in long-term growth dynamics across specific countries. The case in point is the emergence of the US as the world economic superpower, overtaking the UK and Europe in general. The US was a relatively poor country over much of the 19 th century, but in the last few decades of that century, and especially during the 20 th century, the US developed considerable advantage over the UK and other major European countries in terms of not just gross domestic product, but per-capita GDP as well. What may be less known is that over the same period the US has developed a considerable gap over Europe in the schooling attainments of its labor force, especially at the higher education level. The gap remained significant through the entire 20 th century, although it narrowed in the latter part of it, and is continuing to narrow in this decade. Largely accounting for this gap was the massive high school movement of , but an independent gap emerged as early as the 1860s with the US foray into tertiary education beginning with the first Morrill act of 1862, and continuing especially with the massive higher education movement post WWII. A basic argument of this paper is that the US lead in knowledge formation, imperfectly measured by higher educational attainments, has been a major, and perhaps the major instrument through which the US overtook Europe as the economic superpower in the 20 th century.
To illustrate the case empirically, it is worth noting that by popular measures of real income used in international comparisons (GDP, adjusted by Purchasing Power Parity), the US maintains a considerably larger level of per-capita income relative to practically all top 25 countries in the World, including even small tax-heaven countries (see Table A ). But in the early1800s the US had a level of GDP and GDP per-capita level considerably below that of the UK and it was not until 1872 for GDP and 1905 for GDP per-capita when the US has overtaken the UK. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the comparisons poignantly. Note that both the US and UK graphs relating the logarithm of GDP or GDP per-capita to chronological time appear over the long haul, despite year to year and cyclical fluctuations, to assume the shape of an upwardsloping straight line, the slope of which represents the long-term annual growth rate of GDP and GDP per-capita, respectively. The fundamental difference is that the slopes of the lines are higher for the US relative to the UK. In other words, the US has overtaken the UK because its long-term growth rate has been higher: Over the 131-year period 1871-2003 (starting at the point of overtaking) the US v. UK GDP growth rates have been 3.39% v. 1.91%, per-annum, while the corresponding per-capita GDP growth rates were 1.87% v. 1.42. 1 In recent decades, these gaps have narrowed. For example, over the period 1961-2003 the comparative growth rates of GDP in the US v. the UK were 3.37% v. 2.43%, while those for per-capita GDP were 2.25% v. 2.11%, respectively.
2 My basic thesis is that differences in long-term per-capita income growth stem primarily not from differences in physical stocks, including land or other natural resources, but from differences in the rates of growth of human capital. Both human capital formation and its impact on growth, however, are ultimately attributable to underlying institutional and policy factors which reward knowledge formation. In what follows I examine whether this hypothesis has any legs to stand on.
The "mystery" of growth − the human capital hypothesis
What accounts for differences in wealth across nations has been a key puzzle of economic science since Adam Smith. Logically, the question involves both static and dynamic elements: why are some nations doing better than others economically at a point in time, and why some nations become more successful than others over time. In the terminology of the current literature on economic growth and development, this two-part question relates to determinants of the long-term rate of growth, as distinct from the level, of per-capita real income or GDP, taking the latter to represent a scalar measure of personal economic welfare.
A significant advance in the modern economics treatment came about with the neo-classical growth model, which identifies key factors contributing to a steady-state level of per-capita income and its associated capital-labor ratio (K/L), under any exogenously given rate of population growth and level of production technology. The model thus attributes persistent growth in per-capita income over time, which is a better measure of private economic welfare than aggregate income, strictly to exogenous technological shocks. This inference can be conveniently illustrated via the following "neo-classical" aggregate production function: Y = B(T)F(L, K), where Y is the economy's aggregate output, F is a constant-returns-to-scale production function summarizing the impact of convention labor (L) and physical capital (K) inputs on production, and B(T) represents the process by which "technology" (T) augments the impact of these inputs. Under an exogenously given technology, the neo-classical growth model suggests that the steady-state level of per-capita real income (y) is given by:
(1) y* ≡ B(T)f(k*), where k* ≡ (K/L)* is the "golden rule" capital to labor ratio.
Consistent growth in y* can thus occurs through exogenous technological advances. The role of technology, B(T), can be interpreted more broadly to include any and all factors that enhance the utilization of the stocks of labor and physical capital resources available to the economy at a point it time. In principle, therefore, institutional and legal frameworks that facilitate the emergence and operational efficiency of the market economy within which economic resources are utilized are also subsumed by this factor -a point which will be further underscored in later sections. Like technology, these factors are assumed to be exogenously given to the economy. They affect the level of output per-capita at a point in time.
In the last 200 years or so, however, the world has witnessed a relatively new phenomenon in economic history: persistent and seemingly self-sustaining growth in per-capita real income over the long haul in most of the so-called "developed economies" following the technological shock produced by the 'industrial revolution'. Periodic and occasionally large business-cycle disturbances notwithstanding, this phenomenon is still continuing, although at a different pace in different countries. Furthermore, over the last century or so, the world has also experienced episodes of economic takeoffs by less developed countries from relatively stagnant, low income levels into regimes of self-sustaining growth (e.g., the Asian Tigers), as well as episodes in which a relatively poor economy has overtaken a much wealthier one (e.g., the US versus Europe). If "exogenous", i.e., accidental, technological discoveries are the key to this mystery, what accounts for the smooth and continuous, but also variable, productivity growth in different countries, especially when technological discoveries originating in one country can be rapidly imitated and adopted by any other country?
The answer offered by much of the recently developed "endogenous growth" literature (see Lucas, 1988 , and the articles in Ehrlich, 1990 ) rests on identifying "technology" as "human capital", and modeling continuous and self-sustaining technological advances as the outcome of persistent investment in human capital treated as an endogenous variable, subject to individual and social choice, within a dynamic, general equilibrium framework. In essence, human capital is a stock of productive and creative knowledge, having two inherent dimensions: "embodied" and "disembodied". The first is knowledge embodied in workers, or skill, which augments the productivity of labor and physical capital inputs at a point in time. The second is creative knowledge which flows out of the minds of scholars, scientists, inventors and entrepreneurs. This "disembodied" knowledge is manifested in papers, books, patents, and algorithms, and winds up as process and product innovations at the firm and industry level. It is thus more likely to be acquired and produced in tertiary institutions of teaching and research. While these types of human capital are distinct, they are also complementary, as creative knowledge feeds of previously accumulated embodied knowledge, and facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge.
In this view, technology as popularly understood -inventions, innovations, scientific discoveries -does not "fall from heaven": it stems from decisions made by families, firms, and governments to invest in schooling, job training, and research and development, making human capital the relevant "engine, or facilitator, of growth". The fuel that feeds this engine is the rewards offered by efficient markets and institutions to investment in knowledge formation, or human capital. Skill and creative knowledge can accumulate continuously in the long-term only if the underlying reward system supports sufficient investment in skills and creative knowledge.
But how does one measure this complex concept called "human capital"? Modern human capital theory identifies it typically as a function of years of schooling and job experience. These measures cannot account for educational quality. Also missing are supplementary education and research efforts at the firm level, which become more important at advanced stages of development. Indeed, the hypothesis that investment in schooling serves as an engine of long-term growth is yet to be verified through systematic econometric studies (but see section 6.C for some empirical insights). Nevertheless, I here venture to apply this hypothesis using as a case study the comparative long-term real income growth and educational attainment paths of the US v. the UK and other major European countries over the last century. Our dual hypotheses are: a. the economic overtaking of Europe by the US beginning in the late 19 th century, and its continuing dominance through the 20 th century, owe largely to the faster and more wide-spread schooling attainments, especially at the upper-secondary and the tertiary levels; and b. these differential schooling attainments, whether domestically produced or imported, are ultimately attributable to the higher reward the US economy has offered to human capital attainments due to accommodating political and institutional factors. To flash out these arguments we begin by surveying historical evidence on the evolution of the different schooling attainment levels in the US relative to Europe over the 20 th century.
Evidence on educational attainments: Does the thesis have legs to stand on?
The following is a summary of illustrative data on comparative educational attainments and educational spending by selected categories involving the US and other European or OECD countries, as reported in authoritative publications. Since year-to-year reports do not always involve the same categories, occasionally alternative years of data have been selected.
2A. Data on Educational attainments in the US v. OECD countries over the last century.

Average years of Formal Educational Experience of the Population Aged 15-64 in 1913 and 1989 (Maddison's data). (Table 1)
Highlights: According to Maddison (1991) , in 1913 average schooling years in the US (6.97) was behind Germany (6.94) and the UK (7.28). Japan had the lowest attainment (5.10). Even at that point, however, the US already had the highest average higher education attainments in years in 1913 (0.2), followed by Netherlands (0.11), and France (0.10). In 1989, in contrast, Maddison's data indicate that the US became the leader in educational attainments at all levels. Average schooling years in the US shot up to 13.39, ahead of Japan (11.66), France (11.61) and the UK (11.28). Germany slipped to last place at 9.58. The average number of higher-education years attained in the US was 1.67, ahead of France (1.32), with other countries substantially lower. Note that Japan, which was at the last place in average schooling attainments in 1913, rose to second place in 1989. 3 Unfortunately, no comparable data were found for the same population groups and countries in more recent years, but the following tables allow for such international comparisons using alternative educational attainment measures.
2.B. Recent evidence from OECD's Education at a Glance, 1998 and 2003 a. Educational attainments
Percentage of the population that has attained at least tertiary education Type-A by age group 1998 and 2003 (Table 2) Highlights: In 1998, the US's percentage of the population 25-64 years of age educated in Tertiary type-A programs, defined as regular 4-year colleges or universities and advanced research programs, is 26.6%, followed by Norway's 23.7%. The US figure is decisively above Europe's 5 major economies: UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain (E-5), and the average for all OECD countries is scarcely above half of the US. A striking pattern of the educational gap is that it is higher among older age cohorts. In the age group 55-64, for example, the corresponding US percentage is 22%, relative to just 9% for the OECD average. By 2003 Norway catches up with the US in the age group 25-64 at 29% for both, but the average for all OECD countries is still substantially below the US (16%). In the age groups 45-64, however, the US maintains a decisive advantage of a 2 to 1 ratio or over in 2003 as well.
Tertiary type B programs, in contrast, which are more popular in some OECD countries (e.g., Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden) relate to vocational, rather than academic institutions. But even in total tertiary educational attainments, the US is second only to Canada in the age group 25-64 and is leading in the age group 55-64 in 2003. (These data are not included in Table 2 , but the source for both is the same.)
Distribution of the population that has attained at least upper secondary education, by age group (1998) and 2003 (Table 3) Highlights: In 1998 and 2003 the US is leading in the age group 25-64 (86%, 88%), relative to the OECD means (61%, 66%) but much more so in the age group 55-64 (80%, 85%), where the second highest are Germany and Japan (76%, 78%). The gap narrows at younger age groups. In the age group 25-34 in 2003, the US is in 8th place behind, Korea, Norway, Japan, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Sweden, Finland, and Canada, but above all the E-5, including Germany. These data indicate that a number of European countries have caught up with the US in terms of secondary schooling in more recent years. But the US again shows overwhelming leadership in terms of the proportion of the population that has attained at least tertiary education:
Expected years of tertiary education for all 17-year-olds (1998) ( Table 4) Highlights: This table demonstrated more vividly that while the US is still in a dominant position in terms of the expected number of years of tertiary-type A education: 2.7 years for both part time and full time workers. Finland (2.9) and Norway (2.7) have already caught up with the US, but France at 1.9 and the UK at 1.7 have not done so.
The attainments data tell a dynamic story: the US advantage is highest in the older age categories. The gap is narrowing at the younger ages as well as over time, which indicates that Europe is closing the educational gap. But the US still holds a commanding lead in the category of those who hold at least tertiary type-A education, especially at older age cohorts.
b. Expenditures on Education (all figures are in US dollars converted using PPP)
Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP for all levels of education by source of funds (1990, 1995, and 2002) . (Table 5) Highlights: here the US (7.2%) is among the top countries in terms of total expenditure from both public and private sources for education institutions, being surpassed only by Iceland (7.4%), with Denmark and Korea (both 7.1%) following the US. But these numbers are not fully revealing because they do not account for the differences in the magnitude and composition of student populations across countries. More relevant are data on total spending per student, and these are much higher in the US relative to other OECD countries (see below).
Annual expenditures on educational institutions per student (US dollars converted using PPP) by levels of education based on full-time equivalents (2002). (Table 6) Highlights: US expenditure per student on all levels of secondary education in 2002 was $9098, while the average among OECD countries was $6992, but at this point the US already ranks behind Switzerland ($11900), and Norway ($10154) (Luxembourg at $15195, is not a comparable country). In the case of tertiary educational expenditures (both type A and B), however, the US ($20545) is second only to Switzerland ($23714), and only Sweden ($15715) and Denmark ($15183) have spending levels above $15000.
Expenditure per student (private and public) relative to GDP per capita by level of education based on full-time equivalents (2002). (Table 7) Highlights: The US ratio here (25) is just about equal to the average in OECD countries in the case of all secondary expenditures (26), but at 57, it is still substantially above the average in OECD countries (43) in the case of all tertiary expenditures. To the extent that education can be considered consumption good, this ranking indicates only that higher education in the US is now a necessity rather than a luxury good (with income elasticity of demand falling short of unity). But these ratios may largely reflect differences in the weight of other types of spending on, say, private consumption or public defense, across different countries.
How the US schooling advantage emerged -Major Sources and trends
a. The secondary schooling advantage. Claudia Goldin (see, e.g., 2003) argues that what has been mainly responsible for the US advance over Europe is the massive "high school movement of 1910-1940". Her thesis is that, although advances in higher education have been important, the mass secondary education system, which first emerged in the US, set the stage for the subsequent transition to the mass higher education movement. In 1910, school enrollment rates for 5 to 19 year olds were fairly similar among the world's economic leaders (the ratio of enrollments relative to the US set at 1 was: .93 in France, .96 in Germany, and .82 in the UK). But by 1930, the US was 3 to 4 decades ahead of Britain and France, and the high-school gap remained large until the 1950s. The median 18-year old person was already a high-school graduate in the early 1940s. This had a knock-on effect on the massive development of higher education institutions after WWII: when President Franklin Roosevelt signed the GI Bill in 1944, the average GI could attend college because (s)he had already graduated from high school.
b. The Morrill Acts and the Land Grant institutions of higher learning.
What is being overlooked by this explanation, however, is that the US already held the lead in tertiary enrollment in 1913, as Maddison's data show. What may have been responsible for this historical development are the Morrill Acts (Land Grant Creation) of 1862 and1890, and related accommodating factors which made higher education in the US accessible to larger segments of the population relative to Europe. John Morrill was a Congressman from Vermont who managed to convince Congress and President Lincoln to launch a system of public higher education, to be financed through land grants from the Federal government to the States. Under the terms of the Morrill acts, later supplemented by the Hatch Act of 1887, the second Morrill Act of 1890, and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, public lands, or funds in lieu of public lands, were granted to the States for the establishment and support of land-grant colleges and universities, and well as research stations that focused on agricultural and mechanical-art studies and research. I am not aware of any systematic analysis of the role the Morrill Acts had in the evolution of the higher education system in the US, but some important facts allude to their significance. There were 68 land-grant public institutions and universities located in the 50 States and Puerto Rico in 1961. Although at that point, these institutions already accounted for less than 5% of all 4-year institutions of higher learning, these institutions, varying greatly in size from the University of California to Delaware State College, accounted for 48% of total organized research expenditures, 40% of the doctorates conferred, 33% of the current-fund income for educational and general purposes, and 28% of the value of plant assets in the US in 1961. In an open economy human capital is not necessarily just home grown -it can be imported through immigration of skilled and highly educated labor. It is beyond the scope of this essay to assess systematically the brain drain into the US, but there is general agreement for the proposition that the US became a magnate for skilled labor and scientists, first from Europe and later from Asia as well, following the economic advances of the US in the 20 th century, especially after World War II. Dramatic support for this conjecture is provided in a 2005 study by the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, showing that the share of all the science and engineering (S&E) doctorates awarded to international students rose from 23% in 1966 to 39% in 2000, the share of temporary residence among S&E post doctoral scholars increased from 37% in 1982 to 59% in 2002, and more than one-third of US Nobel Laureates to date are foreign born.
A number of caveats need to be recognized, however, for a more complete assessment of the US schooling advantage:
i. The US advantage at the tertiary level applies unequivocally to type-A institutions (regular 4 year colleges/universities), but not as much to tertiary type-B, which are more vocational in nature, which remained more popular in Europe. Also, the numbers do not include postformal training and apprenticeships, which are more prevalent in Europe.
ii. However, schooling attainments have institutional upper limits, e.g., a Ph.D. degree, thus becoming a less effective measure of knowledge formation in highly developed economies. Investment in knowledge at the firm level via general on-the-job training and specific R&D inevitably becomes a more important means of knowledge formation in the more developed economies. The US may still hold a sizeable advantage over Europe in this supplementary human capital measure.
iii. Both schooling lengths and expenditure levels are in essence "inputs" into effective human capital formation. The picture is far more mixed concerning "output" or quality measures, such as math test scores. Evidence indicates that the distribution of US combined mathematics literacy scores of 15-year-old students is, in fact, below that of the average of OECD countries and in the mid-range of the E-5 countries (see Table 8 ). In contrast, at the tertiary level, US's academic institutions are generally ranked higher than Europe's and attract more international students and faculty.
Whence the divergence? -Contributing factors (a). Educational templates:
Goldin (2001) and Goldin and Katz (1999) emphasize the implicit choice between general training (formal schooling) and specific training (apprenticeship, onthe-job training options). General training is more expensive, but it produces more transferable and flexible skills across geographical areas, occupations and industries. The focus on general training in the US is attributable to the US developing into a larger open-trade area relative to European countries. Its labor force in the early 20th century was more mobile and responsive to technological changes in manufacturing, telecommunications, large-scale farming and retailing.
(b). Economic development. The growth of the industrial and transportation sectors of the economy, and the expanding size of the US domestic market, raised the rate of return to education, secondary and higher education specifically. The intellectual high school movements which started in New England spread quickly to the rich agricultural areas in central and western states, where rates of return to schooling were as high for blue collar workers and farmers as for white collar workers. The high school movement spread also because of the decentralized educational system in the US due to the fiscal independence of school boards.
(c). Feedback wealth effects: By the early 20th century, the US already had the highest income per capita, enabling families to more easily finance the higher education of offspring.
(d). Institutional policies related to education:
The US educational system has been more democratic, secular, and gender neutral. In contrast, the educational systems in Germany, France, and other European countries were more rigid and elitist over much of the 20 th century. Differences in institutional restrictions are manifested especially in the context of tertiary education. In the US, publicly subsidized higher education started with the Merrill Acts, becoming massive in 1944, while in Europe this process began later -in some countries not until the 1960s and 70s. In France, e.g., the number of college students started increasing considerably only during the 1980s because of the knock-on effect of expanding secondary education: a political decision was made to increase to 80% the percentage of age cohorts that would reach the level of the baccalauriat, and admissions to the first year of university studies was guaranteed to anyone with a high school diploma, regardless of type. Thus, although European tertiary institutions have become virtually tuition-free in recent decades, access to these colleges and universities remained much more restricted until recently. The US, in contrast, has practiced virtually universal admission to higher education, albeit with differences between community colleges and public and private colleges and universities. As noted in section 2, however, that the gap in higher education enrollments between the US and Europe is fast closing.
5 (e). The Political-Economic Systems: Last, but not least, the US has had a more democratic political system; e.g., suffrage was extended to all (white) US males early in the 19 th century, but much later in almost all European countries. It has also had a freer, decentralized economy, where individuals, families, and firms can make resource allocation decisions in largely free markets, bolstered by the rule of law and protection of property rights, including intellectual property. The US has also had less regulated labor markets, and greater openness to external trade and immigration relative to Europe. These factors ultimately produced a relatively high rate of return to human capital investments for the domestic population, and a larger premium on completed education for skilled immigrants.
The preceding analysis traces the gap in educational attainments favoring the US in the 20 th century to the interplay of two main forces: 1. the feedback effects on private demand for education generated by the new industrial economy, economic growth, and personal wealth; 2. the impact of the more open economy and society in the US on the returns to human capital formation, whether domestically produced or imported, and thereby on economic growth.
By items (a)-(c) above, economic affluence leads to greater demand for education as consumption, or to greater ability to finance private educational investments by overcoming inherent imperfections in the capital market. Items (d)-(e) above trace the growth in educational attainments to institutional, political, and economic policies which lower the costs, or raise the potential returns, to investment in especially higher education, thus enabling individuals and firms to capture more fully any external effects generated by education. These factors also encourage immigration of workers with superior education or entrepreneurial ability. Put differently, the democratic capitalism exercised in the US has contributed to a higher rate of return to individual investment in human capital generally, and tertiary education in particular.
While the two groups of factors represent apparent opposite directions of causality regarding the association between human capital formation and economic growth, they are, in fact, complementary. Greater investment in human capital as a proportion of total production capacity raises productivity growth, while the demand for human capital investments is partly a by-product of economic growth, and this needs to be accounted for in regression analyses aiming to explain productivity growth as a function of educational spending. But this would be a partial-equilibrium view of economic development. The endogenous growth, general equilibrium model discussed below sees both human capital formation and productivity growth as endogenous outcomes of underlying institutional, legal, and political factors. Moreover, prudent political choices are also affected by the schooling level of the electorate. In this view, the critical causal factors can be traced especially to those summarized in item (e).
Linking human capital formation with economic growth:
A. The endogenous growth hypothesis: human capital as the engine of growth.
The literature on endogenous growth attempts to go beyond the neo-classical model of economic growth in two important ways: a. explaining persistent growth as a result of factors endogenous to the economy, rather than exogenous, unpredictable technological inventions; b. identifying "technology" as human capital, or knowledge. By this view, knowledge breeds greater knowledge. Some new knowledge translates into higher productivity of existing resources (embodied human capital), and some is manifested through innovations, patents, books and manuscripts, and specialized capital goods that account for what is commonly perceived of as technical innovations ("disembodied human capital"). Human capital is ultimately the source of both types of "technology", and can therefore be considered the "engine of growth" (see Lucas, 1988 , Becker et al., 1990 , and Ehrlich and Lui, 1991 .
The reason persistent growth is enabled by human capital formation is that knowledge is the only asset that is not subject to diminishing returns, as Frank Knight argued. The idea can be formalized in a simple way by specifying a law of human capital accumulation as follows:
(2) H t+1 = A(H e + H t )h t Here H t and H t+1 represent the human capital stocks of a representative agent in generations t and t+1, A represents the technology of learning and human capital transfer, (H e + H t ) denotes production capacity (H e representing fixed personal or family endowments and H t acquired knowledge at t), which is transformed to real income, or output, at a constant, competitive wage rate w=1; and h t represents the fraction of production capacity spent by members of generation t on the human capital formation of members of generation t+1. While the level of human capital attained by the next generation, H t+1 , could in principle be subject to diminishing returns in the rate of investment by the current generation, h t , it is specified as a linear function of the human capital attained by the current generation by the argument that attained knowledge enhances the productivity of both investment in new knowledge and the intergenerational knowledge transfer.
Human capital can thus perpetually grow from one generation to the other essentially because the level of productive knowledge attained by a current generation serves as an input into the generation of knowledge in the succeeding generation. But whether the latter exceeds the former (or H t+1 >H t ) and to what extent, critically depends on whether investment in human capital exceeds a threshold level: by equation (2) if investment, h t , is not sufficiently high, the knowledge attained by generation t+1 will be stuck at the level of generation t, H t , producing a stagnant equilibrium level of output. In a decentralized market economy and a democratic political system, investment in human capital is affected directly by individuals and families, as well as indirectly by the level of public spending they demand from their local and federal government.
Of course, the production of human capital is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for expansion in productive capacity. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that accumulated human capital contributes to expansion in desired output (Y) through the aggregate production function introduced in section 1 and the accommodating role of efficient markets, which assure the allocation of skill and creative knowledge to their most productive uses. The endogenous growth paradigm indicates that in a steady state of continuous growth, physical capital accumulation, including natural resources and productive land, would adjust to the pace of human capital accumulation, making the latter the economy's engine of growth. At a given population level, continuous human capital formation will lead to continuous expansion in real output per-capita (y).
Human capital (H) thus replaces the concept of "technology" (T) in equation (1).
The model outlined in the preceding discussion is a closed economy model. In an open economy, expansion of output is also conditional on the ability of the economy to retain the human capital it produces. The US was not the first to take off: the Industrial revolution began in Europe. But the emergence of the US as economic superpower can be attributed to the ability of the US market to provide a high reward for human capital investments, and thus to both retain domestically-produced human capital and attract human capital produced abroad.
B. The special role of higher education in economic growth.
The previous analysis also rests on the simplifying assumption that workers are homogenous. In reality, people are heterogeneous in terms of both innate ability and family endowments they possess. A more complete view of endogenous growth and development, based on human capital as engine of growth, must recognize differences among individuals and families in terms of their capacity to both acquire and implement knowledge. This is the framework used in my current joint work on income growth and income inequality (Ehrlich and Kim, 2004) which is used to explain the dynamic pattern of both income growth and income distribution over different stages of economic development.
The story is simple: human capital, as measured by average educational attainments, has a direct effect on the skill and productivity of the existing labor force, but also an indirect effect on the emergence of new ideas i.e., technological innovations and productivity growth. Those who are in a position to acquire more human capital, especially higher education, because of personal ability or family endowments allowing them to more economically finance higher education, are likely to be the "first movers" when it comes to create new knowledge, or implement advances in knowledge triggered by technological shocks. Both schools and the labor market also allow for the socialization of knowledge, whereby the achievements of workers with superior knowledge can spill over to, and be shared by, other workers. These "spillover effects" tie population groups of different human capital attainments together over the development process as well as in a regime of persistent growth, and ultimately produce stable income distributions. The existence of spillover effects and imperfections in the capital market also justify government's subsidization of education, and especially higher education, in order to maximize social income and welfare.
C. The role of underlying factors
The endogenous growth models described above are general equilibrium models. In such models, both human capital accumulation and income growth are "endogenous" choice variables: they attain self-sustaining growth as a consequence of individual choices about optimal investments individuals make in themselves and their offspring, motivated by a desire to maximize the return they obtain on these investments. Individual welfare maximization in a decentralized market system thus leads to continuous, self-sustaining growth for the average person in the economy -a dynamic restatement of Adam Smith's basic proposition.
But this also means that human capital accumulation and income growth are two sides of the same coin: while the production functions (1) and (2) represent a causal relation flowing from per-capita human capital formation (H) to per-capita income (y), this is a secondary causality. The primary one relates to the causal effects of underlying "parameters" which influence both variables; most importantly, factors enhancing the incentives individuals and families have to invest in their own, and their offspring's, knowledge, as well as the ability of the domestic economy to effectively utilize the human capital it generates or imports in domestic production.
Basic parameters affecting both output and knowledge accumulation are knowledge-production and transfer technologies (A and B(T) in equations 2 and 1), and population longevity (see Ehrlich and Lui, 1991) , which enable those investing in learning and training to recoup the benefits of their investments over a longer life-time horizon. Equally important, however, are institutional and public policy factors affecting market conditions that affect the financing cost of education and assure a competitive return to investments in both human and physical capital in labor and product markets. These include a legal system protecting property rights, including intellectual property, and a free-enterprise system where wages and rates of return on investment are determined by competitive market forces rather than bureaucratic intervention. They also include accommodating public policies which help overcome capital market constraints in education financing and internalize spillover effects generated by basic science. These conditions, including government regulations and tax policies, can greatly affect output growth by the way they enhance or discourage the incentives to invest in human capital.
Under a heavily regulated system, let alone a command economy, the bureaucracy rather than free markets determines the allocation and remuneration of resources, including education. The Soviet Union invested broadly in education that assured military might, not necessarily economic might, and fostered investment in "political capital", promising bureaucratic power to apparatchiks, rather than in market-driven productive human capital (see Ehrlich and Lui, 1999 .) A free-market system is better geared to reward human capital of the productive type through the market mechanism, and is thus more likely to produce self-generating growth.
Free trade and an open economy create greater opportunities for human capital accumulation, but also greater challenges. Greater opportunities, because investment in "disembodied knowledge" such as new production processes or new products is subject to scale economies that make their returns higher in a larger markets, which are facilitated by free trade. Greater challenges, because opportunities to migrate from one region or country to another mean that investment in human capital made in one place may actually wind up benefiting another. Public investment in human capital in Peru, or in Ireland before 1986, for example, did not bring about an economic takeoff and self-sustaining growth partly because graduates of institutions of higher learning sought employment in the US market rather than in their own countries. But this does not refute the thesis that investment in human capital is the key to economic growth. It simply reflects the fact that investment that is not backed up by a market system that assures an adequate reward to knowledge cannot be expected to yield its full economic benefits.
A final underlying factor is the role of externalities inherent in both the production and transfer of human capital. Private human capital, unlike physical capital, cannot serve as collateral in financial markets, which limits borrowing opportunities. This justifies a public role in the financing of education at all levels, but especially for higher education where investment is substantial, which enhances accessibility to such educational opportunities according to talent, rather than social class and privilege. Moreover, since higher education can generate spillover effects benefiting less educated workers, subsidizing it becomes an especially important role of government. That the US was a leader in opening up mass high school and higher-education systems has been a significant factor explaining its emergence as an economic superpower.
Evidence linking education and productivity growth:
A. Evidence from growth accounting
Estimates of the role of schooling in explaining per-worker income variations or growth rely on a "growth accounting methodology", following the works of Denison (1974) and Solow (1957) . The technique ascribes changes in the aggregate economy (GDP per-capita) to variations in aggregate measures of capital utilization and labor employment, with the labor employment index weighted by measures of the education attainments of workers. Claudia Goldin and others estimate that over the 20th century (actually since 1915) the expansion in the educational index has accounted for close to a quarter of the 1.62 percent per-year increase in US labor productivity. Hall and Jones (1999) estimate that in 1988, educational attainments account for over 20 percent of the international variation in labor productivity across different countries.
Common to all studies using the growth accounting methodology is finding a substantial unexplained residual variation in productivity, known as the "Solow residual". It is generally attributed to "technological growth." However, much of this residual variation may be ascribed to the indirect role of education in inducing technological advancements, as technology is a derivative of special knowledge, or specific human capital. Indeed, this is the crux of the "endogenous growth" literature that identifies human capital as the engine of growth.
B. Evidence from rates of return to education
That education is the critical factor explaining differences in earnings across individuals at a point in time has been well established by human capital theory and related empirical work. The human-capital-earnings-generating function links the logarithm of individual earnings to the number of years of schooling and a quadratic specification of the number of years of job-market experience. This specification allows the measurement of the "rate of return to human capital" as the regression coefficient associated with the number of years of schooling. Table 9 , based on a study by Heckman et al. (2003) , indicates that the real rate of return to schooling at all levels has been stable at upward of 10% in 6 decennial years, but has approached 13% in 1990. More important, by estimating separate regressions for white and black males, this study shows that over the period , rates of return to blacks, initially lower than those of whites, have more than caught up with the latter in 1990, indicating that the US labor markets have become more competitive over time, and better able to reward human capital regardless of race.
The Mincer linear regression model does not allow for separate estimation of rates of returns by alternative levels of schooling. By relaxing various linearity restrictions implicit in the Mincer model, however, Heckman et al. (2003) have estimated rates of return for primary, secondary and tertiary levels of schooling as well. Their results indicate that the rates of return are considerably higher for those actually completing High School and College education relative to other levels of schooling 6 . Other studies indicate that that the rate of return to especially college education rises at times of rapid technological innovation, essentially because people with higher skills adapt more quickly to changes in technology.
These studies focus on returns to education captured in market earnings. New work in economics indicates that this may greatly understate the full individual returns to education, which are derived from various non-market activities as well, such as improved health, longevity, and implicit individual assessments of their own life-saving values. Ehrlich and Yin (2005) , e.g., estimate that both age-specific life expectancies and implicit private values of lifesaving are substantially higher for those with tertiary, relative to high-school education.
C. Linking investment in schooling and per-capita income growth
Empirical studies linking educational attainments and economic growth have not produced uniform conclusions, partly because of disagreements about the quality of available schooling data. Barro and Lee's (1993) study, for example, indicates some positive but weak correlation between the overall schooling data they assembled and growth rates. Following Ehrlich and Kim 2005, we here attempt to offer a different perspective on the link between education and growth by stressing the correspondence between investments in education, rather than the level of educational attainments, and long-term growth rates of per-capita income. By our theoretical analysis, the steady state rates of investment in human capital, which are endogenous outcomes of underlying demographic, institutional and public policy variables, are the critical determinant of corresponding long-term growth rates of both per-worker human capital stocks and percapita real output in a growth-equilibrium regime. While reported data on educational outlays are incomplete, investment levels can be imputed from time-series evidence on relatively longterm rates of growth of educational attainments in different countries. We thus expect a systematic link between equilibrium values of average growth rates of educational attainments per-worker (H) and per capita GDP (GDPn) over relatively lengthy periods of time in countries experiencing persistent growth. To test this hypothesis, we first estimate expected growth rates of per-capita GDP, [1+g(GDPn)*], and schooling attainments, [1+g(H)*], which are predicted from underlying country-specific factors through a regression model described below, and then compute their association using the following log-linear regression specification:
Specifically, we use Barro and Lee (2003) data on average schooling years attained by the population aged 15-65, and Summers and Heston estimates of real GDPn as proxies for our endogenous variables, along with data on explanatory variables listed below, to construct a panel of 57 developing and developed countries over an intermediate-length period of 31 years . We first run fixed-effects regressions relating each of our two endogenous variables to a set of underlying country-specific factors. These include demographic variables (population longevity measures), public policy variables (the share of government spending in GDP and a measure of the social security tax rate), as well as chronological time and the interaction terms of these explanatory variables with time. (For an explanation of the role of these explanatory variables see Ehrlich and Kim, 2005 .) The fixed-effects specification also accounts for the role of idiosyncratic institutional factors that are unchanging over the sample period. This method allows us to generate multiple predicted values of g(GDPn)* and g(H)*, in each country over our sample period. We can then estimate equation (3) using an OLS regression model. Variant 1 of the model imposes a common intercept term (α) representing the same technology linking human capital formation to output growth in all countries, whereas variant 2 allows for variation in the latter, using a fixed-effects regression specification.
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The idea behind this experiment follows the basic thesis underlying our endogenous growth model. If human capital is the engine of growth, the equilibrium rates of growth of human capital and real income should be endogenous outcomes of the economy's institutional and demographic factors, including the degree of government intervention in private economic activity. If each of these two variables is predicted separately from these underlying countryspecific "parameters", they should be closely related within countries. The results are presented in Figure 3 and Table 10 . Figure 3 shows the noisy scatter of estimated expected growth rates of per-capita GDP and average schooling attainments within countries. The line going through this scatter represents the estimated regression line of variant 1 of equation (3). Table 10 shows also the estimated results of variant (2) of equation (3), which cannot be depicted graphically. The results in Table 10 indicate the existence of a statistically significant correlation between the predicted growth rates of per-capita schooling attainments and real income within countries in our panel. These results are experimental and preliminary. More complete measures of human capital formation and productivity growth over longer periods, and more elaborate sensitivity analyses, would be required to confirm the findings.
EPILOGUE: Looking back and looking ahead
Although the evidence assembled in this paper concerning the long-term growth dynamics of per-capita GDP and schooling attainments is largely "circumstantial", it appear to be remarkably consistent with the view that human capital formation, even though imperfectly measured by schooling, has been the "secret weapon" through which the US has been able to achieve its robust long-term rate of persistent, self-sustaining growth in productivity and percapital income. Moreover, it supports the hypothesis that the documented educational gap between the US and Europe in terms of average, high school, and especially higher education attainments is a major factor explaining why the US has overtaken Europe as an economic superpower in the 20 th century. Can the US maintain its lead in the 21 st century? Table 11 summarizes the evidence on educational attainments shown in tables 2 and 3 for the 5 major European countries (E-5: Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain) expressed as percentages of the US's attainments over the period 1998-03, which may serve as a rough indicator of the trends over the last few decades as well. Even over this short period we see evidence of closing educational gaps, primarily for upper high-school attainments, where the simple average level of educational attainment for the age group 25-64 in the E-5 rose from 64.9% to 68.2% of that of the US. The gaps are closing even faster at the tertiary type-A level, where the corresponding simple average level of educational attainments rose from 46.7% to just 51.7%. Of all E-5 countries, the UK has converged most closely to the US's educational attainments at the tertiary level, rising from 55.6% in 1998 to 65.5% in 2003.
However, as argued earlier, schooling attainments are subject to institutional upper limits (say, Ph.D. education), thus becoming a less effective indicator of human capital formation at more advanced development levels, where knowledge generated within firms may be a more important supplementary measure of effective human capital. Indeed, corresponding trends in long-term GDP and per-capita GDP (GDPPC) growth rates present a more mixed picture. . The alternative measures of longterm percentage differences exhibit quite a bit of noise and sensitivity to influential sub-periods, but they also indicate some consistent patterns: With the notable exceptions of mid-term cycles, such as the Great Depression, when the US absolute GDPPC gap over the E-5 was significantly declining along with the US's growth rate advantage before rising again during recovery, and World War II and its aftermath, when the US absolute gap over the E-5 was rising because of the collapse of the E-5, but was then followed by exceptionally high GDPPC growth rates in the E-5 (thus a falling US advantage) over the following 2-3 decades of recovery, the US GDPPC growth rate advantage over the E-5 seems to persist, recently trending back toward its 1850-2003 advantage after an intermediate period of decline. An important exception, however, seems to be the UK, where the US's long-term GDPPC growth-rate gap has been falling more steadily since the early 1930s, and again from the early 1960s when the UK has also made significant progress in relative educational attainments. In Germany, in contrast, the US's GDPPC growth-rate advantage has intensified since 1967, while its educational advantage over Germany has been increasing in more recent years. Even this, more recent evidence points to a positive correlation between relative growth rates of tertiary schooling attainments and percapita GDP, at least in these two countries.
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Clearly, there are other forces in play which explain the evolution of comparative growth rates of the US and the E-5 over the 20 th century, such as changes in labor market, welfare, freetrade, and immigration policies, but the US advantage in human capital formation, as judged by schooling attainments especially at the tertiary level, seems to provide a powerful explanation for its long-term growth rate advantage over Europe.
Is the US losing this advantage? The closing schooling gaps might indicate that Europe could catch up with, and even surpass this indicator of US's human capital formation and ensuing percapita income growth. However, as Figure 5 shows, the absolute historic gap between the US and the E-5 in per-capita GDP levels is still far from closing, and it will continue to grow in absolute terms even if the respective growth rates converge. More important, future developments depend on the comparative trends in the underlying causal factors which produced the US long-term advantage in the first place.
Looking back, it is ultimately the relative efficiency of the free-market and open-economy system in the US and the relatively higher reward it provided to skill and creative knowledge, which induced a higher rate of growth and efficient utilization of various components of human capital, whether domestically produced or imported. The democratic political system in the US has also augmented the process of human capital formation through prudent government subsidization of education generally, and higher education in particular, much ahead of similar efforts by Europe. These accommodating factors have been a major determinant of the ability of the US to attract, and put to effective use, human capital from other countries as well.
Looking ahead, therefore, one may conclude that continued support of an efficient economic environment that encourages persistent human capital formation and utilization could sustain the US lead for years to come. The US still enjoys a significant advantage in terms of the quality of its higher education system and innovative activities relative to Europe and other countries. At the same time, there are strong indications of the failure of the public elementary system in the US to produce competitive educational outcomes relative to other countries. Recognition of current shortcomings in the public education system in the US, along with the challenge to compete with educational systems in other countries, may improve human capital formation in the US at all levels. Whether or not the US lead is maintained is ultimately a secondary issue. World welfare would be best served if all countries adopt competitive economic and educational policies yielding continuous human capital formation, per-capita income growth, and equitable income distributions.
Footnotes
1 These statistics are taken from Maddison (2003) . All figures are converted to 1990 US dollars using the Geary Khamis Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) method. Similar graphs apply to other major European countries as well. For example the growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita (in parentheses) over the period 1850-2003 -starting when the US overtook other major European countries in per-capita GDP -were: 3.52 (1.83) for the US; 1.98 (1.46) for the UK; 2.06 (1.72) for France; 2.31 (1.71) for Germany; 2.48 (1.75) for Italy; 2.18 (1.82) for Spain.
2 The shorter-term trends have been uneven for other major European countries. Over the period 1961-2003 the per-capita GDP growth rate in France and Italy were 0.21% and 0.40% higher than in the US, respectively, while in Germany it was -.14% lower. However, over 1976 However, over -2003 .g., the US's per-capita GDP growth was 0.28% higher than France's, 0.47% higher than Germany's, and .06% higher than Italy's.
Since the countries in our panel are in varying development stages, in additional regressions which we skip here for simplicity, we also allow the intercept terms in variants 1 and 2 to drift downward over time, which our model predicts to occur over the development process. These regressions produce very similar results to those reported in table 10, and have even higher explanatory power. Econometric procedure: see text and footnote 6. 
